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III. JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, which was obtained 
upon assignment from the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court originally 
obtained jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2-3(j) (1958 as amended). 
VI. ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL 
Issue: Did the Trial Court err when it found that the defendant paid the 
plaintiff for her interest in the Company awarded by the Decree of Divorce? 
This issue is a question of fact. Accordingly, the trial court's findings 
should not be set aside upon appellate review unless it is determined that the trial court's 
determination was clearly erroneous. Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah 1984). 
Issue: Did the Trial Court err when it found that the statute of limitation set 
forth in U.C.A. §78-12-22(1) barred plaintiff's action to enforce paragraph 3b of the 
Decree of Divorce? 
The issue as to whether U.C.A. §78-12-22(1) or another statue of limitation 
applies to paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce is a question of law which should be 
reviewed for "correctness." Gramlich v. Munsev. 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992). The 
issue as to whether an applicable statute of limitation was suspended by estoppel, lulled, 
or tolled, is a question of fact, which should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard. Brower v. Brown. 744 P.2d 1337. 138-39 (Utah 1987). 
Issue: Did the Trial Court err in failing to address the issue of a 
constructive trust or to find that a constructive existed in favor of the plaintiff? 
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The issue of whether a court should impose a constructive trust is primarily 
a question of fact. Mattes v. Olearain. 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court 
found that the plaintiff had previously received payment for her interest in the Company 
and accordingly did not make findings concerning the plaintiffs theory of constructive 
trust. The primary question on appeal is whether the trial court should have addressed the 
issue despite the court's finding that no continuing interest existed to be held in trust. 
Issue: Did the Trial Court render a decision on an issue not presented 
before it for determination? 
Findings made by a court that are not requested by the parties or which are 
based on issues neither raised nor trial are carefully scrutinized on review. Combe v. 
Warren's Family Drive-Inns. Inc.. 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984). There exists however, a 
preliminary issue as together this scenario is presented by the case at hand, which may be 
determined by a review of the record. 
Issue: Did the trial court err in failing to issue discovery sanctions against 
the defendant? 
A decision as to whether sanctions on discovery are appropriate is primarily 
the prerogative of the trial court but is reviewable for error upon appeal. See Morton v. 
Continental Banking Co.. 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1977). This issue may be determined by a 
review of the records and the orders of the court. 
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VI. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF STATUTES & RULES 
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-22 
An action may be brought within eight years: 
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or 
territory within the United States; 
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide support or 
maintenance for dependent children. 
VII. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal stems from plaintiff/appellant's filing of an order to show cause 
that requested several types of relief, including an affirmation, calculation, and delivery 
of plaintiff s interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc. (hereinafter "the Company"), and 
requests for an accounting of the current assets of the Company. (R. 328). All of 
plaintiffs requests were pursuant to paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce, which reads 
as follows: "[The Plaintiff is awarded] [o]ne-half (1/2) of Defendant's interest in 
Kessimakis Produce, Inc., whether the same be evidenced by stock certificate or 
otherwise and the Defendant is ordered to execute and deliver appropriate instruments 
evidencing the transfer of such interest." (R. 19-20). 
Defendant contended that he had already paid the plaintiff for her interest 
and that plaintiffs action was untimely. The trial court held for the defendant on both 
counts. The same issues are appealed by the plaintiff. 
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B. Procedural History 
The Decree of Divorce was entered on August 28, 1974. The case was 
appealed on two previous occasions, with the second appeal concluding in 1978. The 
language of paragraph 3b was unchanged by the appeals process. 
Plaintiff/appellant filed an order to show cause on November 10, 1994, seeking 
enforcement of paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce. (R. 328). The order to show cause 
was heard by Commissioner Arnett, who recommended that the action be dismissed as it 
was barred by the statute of limitations. (R. 348). Plaintiff objected to the commissioner's 
recommendations (R. 349-366, 375-378). Defendant filed a memorandum in support of 
the recommendations (R. 367-374). 
Before the objection was resolved with Judge Pat Brian, plaintiff set a 
second hearing before the commissioner, seeking a determination that defendant had not 
delivered the interest, the same relief already requested in paragraph 2 of the original 
order to show cause. (R. 328, 387). The commissioner recommended that no delivery of 
the shares had been made as no documentary evidence had been located at that time.1 (R. 
454). Defendant objected to the proposed order. (R. 459-65, 500-02, 510-13). 
At the time plaintiff requested the second hearing, she also filed written 
discovery requests and, later, a subpoena duces tecum requesting, among other things, 
current financial information from the Company. (R. 404, 455). 
1
 Prior to the second hearing, Judge Brian signed the plaintiffs proposed order, which was not in conformity with 
the commissioner's recommendation of dismissal, because he had not noticed defendant's objections. (R. 409). 
Judge Brian later signed an order verifying that the statute of limitations was an issue in the case in order to correct 
the mistake. (R. 531). 
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A hearing on the plaintiffs objection to the recommendation of dismissal 
was held before Judge Brian on February 27, 1996. Both parties filed trial briefs prior to 
the hearing (R. 521, 532). The judge issued a minute entry stating that it would review 
the statute of limitations question. (R. 539). Thereafter, Judge Brian issued a minute entry 
stating that the statute of limitations set forth in U.C.A. §78-12-22(1) was applicable to 
plaintiffs action. (R. 547). 
The parties were unable to agree on an order and the parties again met with 
Judge Brian on December 5, 1996, and made proffers of testimony and evidence. At that 
time, the court made specific rulings on the outstanding discovery issues, ordered 
discovery on limited issues, and continued the matter. (R. 598-601). 
C. Disposition at the Trial Court 
A bench trial was held on May 28, 1997 (R. 614) and was concluded on 
October 2, 1997. (R. 631). The trial court issued findings and an order on October 17, 
1998, holding, among other things, (1) that the defendant had paid plaintiff for her 
interest under paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce, (2) that defendant had not waived 
the statute of limitations defense, (3) that U.C.A. §78-12-22(1) barred plaintiffs action, 
and (4) that plaintiff did not establish any lulling, tolling, or other defense to the running 
of the statute of limitations. This appeal followed. 
VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. and Mrs. Kessimakis were divorced on August 23, 1974. (R. 19). 
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Paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce reads: "[The Plaintiff is awarded] 
[o]ne-half (1/2) of Defendant's interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., whether the same be 
evidenced by stock certificate or otherwise and the Defendant is ordered to execute and 
deliver appropriate instruments evidencing the transfer of such interest." (R. 19). 
The defendant appealed the Decree of Divorce on two occasions 
(Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 580 
P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978). The language of the Decree of Divorce was not altered in either 
appeal. 
At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce in 1974, the defendant 
owned a Twenty percent (20%) interest in the Company. (R. 337). 
The parties created a joint stock trading account administered by the 
plaintiff's brother, Les Anderton, in 1980. (Tr. 17-18, 54, 81-82). 
The defendant testified that he initially placed about $18,000 in the account 
(Tr. 81). Plaintiff claimed in her deposition that she initially deposited "about five or 
$6,000." (Deposition of Betty Kessimakis, p. 21). 
Testimony at trial from the defendant and Mr. Anderton indicated that 
approximately $26,000 in profits were paid out of the joint trading account in 1980. (Tr. 
60-63, 117, 121, 124). This number was corroborated by defendant's introduction at trial 
of trading receipts and an accounting of profits. (Tr. 60-63). 
The plaintiff testified that the value of the Company in 1980 was 
approximately $10,000 to $15,000. (Tr. 55). Plaintiff did not contradict this testimony. 
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The defendant testified that he paid the plaintiff $21,000 to $24,000 of the 
profits on the joint trading account in return for her interest in the Company in 1980 or 
1981. (R. 337; Tr. 57-58, 82,98). Plaintiff denied that she received any funds from the 
account. (Tr. 18-20,37-38). 
Maintaining that she had not been paid, plaintiff testified that defendant 
committed actions and made statements that constituted estoppel or a lulling or tolling of 
the statute of limitations (Tr. 13-14, 21-25, 42-47, 152). Defendant denied the 
allegations. (Tr. 59-60, 64, 88). 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal is brought by the plaintiff /appellant due to her dissatisfaction 
with the trial court's factual findings. The trial court found, as a issue of fact, that in 
1980, plaintiff received payment for the interest awarded to her in Kessimakis Produce, 
Inc. pursuant to paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce. This finding should not be 
disturbed absent a showing of clear error. The testimony and evidence support the trial 
court's decision. 
The other issues raised by the appellant are secondary to the issue of 
payment. If the payment issue is upheld, there is no need to address them. Appellant 
argues that defendant/appellee's assertion of the affirmative defense of statute of 
limitations was waived; that no statute of limitations applies to paragraph 3b of the 
Decree; and that in the event the statute of limitations does apply, its running was 
estopped, lulled, or tolled. The statute of limitations was not waived. It was raised by the 
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very first responsive document that was filed by the defendant and was extensively 
discussed and briefed by both parties before the trial court. The case law from this 
jurisdiction and others show that paragraph 3b of the Decree is indeed subject to a statute 
of limitations, specifically U.C.A. §78-12-22(1). Finally, the court made a factual 
finding, after hearing extensive testimony, that there was no estoppel, lulling, or tolling of 
the running of the statute of limitations. 
Appellant raises another secondary issue, claiming that the trial court 
committed error by failing to address the issue of a constructive trust. Because the trial 
court found that plaintiff/appellant's interest in the Company ceased in 1980 when she 
was paid for that interest, her theory that the interest was held in trust by the 
defendant/appellee, thereby defeating the running of any statute of limitations, was moot. 
The trial court did not err in failing to address this issue. 
In another secondary issue, appellant claims the court committed error 
(1) by making findings based on issues not properly before the court (i.e. the statute of 
limitations she claims was waived) and (2) by granting relief that neither party requested. 
The first assertion is the same issue as that raised above and the record and facts show 
that the statute of limitations defense was properly raised before the court. In addition, 
plaintiff does not dispute that the issue of payment, which was the primary reason for the 
trial court's denial of plaintiffs claim, was properly before the court. As for the second 
assertion, the trial court was fully justified in denying plaintiffs action as the denial was 
a direct response to the relief requested by the plaintiff and the defendant. 
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Lastly, the appellant claims that appellee should be subject to sanctions for 
failure to comply with discovery requests. The record shows that the judge first 
suspended discovery and then specifically limited the discovery issues based on 
defendant's motion for a protective order. The parties complied with the court's order 
and there is no justification for sanctions. 
Plaintiffs appeal requests the court to overturn findings of fact that were 
clearly sustainable and justified by the facts and testimony before the trial court and is 
frivolous in nature. The appellee should be awarded costs and attorney's fees incurred on 
appeal. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A. Did the Trial Court err when it found that the defendant 
paid the plaintiff for her interest in the Company awarded 
by the Decree of Divorce? 
The trial court correctly found, based upon the evidence and testimony 
before it, that the plaintiff was paid for her interest in the Company through the proceeds 
of the joint stock trading account. This conclusion was based upon a factual 
determination of the trial court. 
The standard of review for this issue is the clearly erroneous standard. In 
order to successfully challenge a trial court's factual findings, the appellant "must 
marshal the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial courts findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" In Re Estate of BartelL 
776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
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There is more than adequate evidence and testimony to substantiate defendant/appellee's 
assertion that he paid the plaintiff for her interest in the Company eighteen years ago. 
The defendant testified that he set up a joint stock trading account in his 
and the plaintiffs names (Tr. 54, 81-82; confirmed by plaintiff Tr. 17-18) with the 
understanding that the proceeds from the joint trading account were to be used to 
purchase the plaintiffs interest in the Company. (Tr. 54-56). Plaintiff denied that this was 
the purpose of the account. (Tr. 137-38). Defendant testified that the parties used the 
plaintiffs brother, Les Anderton, as the stock broker on the account (Tr. 64) and that the 
plaintiffs address was the primary address on the account. (Tr. 56). These two facts were 
confirmed by Les Anderson in his testimony (Tr. 101-102, 122) and by the plaintiff (Tr. 
17-18,35, 37, 49-50). Mr. Anderton also testified that the plaintiff had as much authority 
over the trading account as the defendant and could freely withdraw funds. (Tr. 122). 
Mr. Anderton testified that, according to company records, $26,245.65 was 
paid out as earnings on the account. (Tr. 117, 121,124). The defendant produced carbon 
copies of trading receipts from the trading account, a record of the stock trades prepared 
by his secretary and girlfriend at the time the account was in existence, and a summary of 
these records. (Tr. 60-63). This evidence was consistent with the accounting produced by 
Les Anderton. No party was able to locate any cancelled checks, tax returns, or other 
physical evidence as to where the profits from the account were distributed. Such records 
would have been approximately 17 years old. Mr. Anderton testified that he did not know 
the purpose for the account and that he did not know whether earnings went to the 
plaintiff or defendant. (Tr. 117, 120-122). The defendant testified that he paid 
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approximately $21,000 to $24,000 of the earnings to the plaintiff. (R. 337; Tr. 57-58, 81-
82, 98-99). The plaintiff stated that she was not paid any funds from the account. (Tr. 18-
20, 37-38). However, the plaintiff also testified that she claimed one-half of the profits 
from the account on her tax returns. (Tr. 22-23, 40). 
The defendant testified that the value of the Company in 1980 was 
approximately $10,000 to $15,000. (Tr. 55). At trial, the plaintiff offered no evidence or 
testimony to contest defendant's valuation. 
During trial, and now upon appeal, plaintiff claims that defendant "changed 
his story" about the time and his method of payment for plaintiffs interest in the 
Company. This assertion is not reasonable. In his response to the initial Order to Show 
Cause, defendant stated the following in an affidavit: "In or about 1981 or 1982,1 paid to 
the plaintiff the sum of approximately Twenty-one Thousand Dollars ($21,000.00) or 
Twenty-two Thousand Dollars ($22,000.00) for the purchase of her interest in 
Kessimakis Produce, Inc." (R. 337, fl). Plaintiff claims this statement is inconsistent 
with defendant's later statements that the joint trading account was the source of funds 
for the payment. At the time of the submission of the responsive affidavit, defendant had 
not had reasonable opportunity to locate any 15-year-old records to enable him to specify 
a specific date or amount for the payment. It was not until later that defendant was able to 
find the joint stock trading account records that evidenced the payment. The stock trading 
records very closely corroborate and support defendant's recollections, showing that 
approximately $26,000 of profit was paid out of the joint account during 1980. 
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Plaintiff also states that the defendant's changed because he claimed that he 
had paid her off in cash. (Brief of Appellant, p. 18). Defendant's affidavit makes no such 
claim. Defendant did testify at trial that he gave the trading account profits to the plaintiff 
in cash as it was his practice to deal in cash at the time. (Tr. 57-59). Plaintiff admitted 
that virtually all of defendant's alimony and child support payments were paid in cash 
prior to her filing this action. (Tr. 145). There was no change in defendant's story. The 
trial court agreed and found the defendant's testimony and evidence to be credible. 
The plaintiffs testimony was less credible than the defendant's testimony. 
Plaintiff testified that the account was merely a friendly investment between the parties 
and that the defendant was trying to reconcile with her (Tr. 137-38), despite the fact that, 
at the time, defendant had a live-in girlfriend, had a poor record of paying child support 
(Tr. 51-52), and the parties had just undergone an extremely contentious divorce which 
was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court twice. 
Plaintiffs testimony apparently caused the trial court to question plaintiffs 
veracity on other facts as well. When the defendant closed the joint account in 1981, he 
transferred the existing balance of the account, approximately $36,000, into a personal 
account in his name only. (Tr. 95-96, 124). The defendant said this was done because the 
plaintiff had at that point been paid for her interest. (Tr. 95-96). However, the plaintiff 
claimed that, in addition to her not receiving any of the profits of the account, she had 
also been wronged by the defendant's transfer. (Tr. 39). She testified that she was "bitter" 
about the transfer because the balance contained funds that she had placed in the account. 
(Tr. 138-142). Despite this, plaintiff also admitted that she did not complain to the 
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defendant or Mr. Anderton, her brother, who was the broker for the account. (Tr. 39-40, 
142-144, 153-156). Mr. Anderton also testified that the plaintiff did not inform him of 
any concerns about payments from the account or its closing. (Tr. 123-125). These 
inconsistencies were addressed by Judge Brian in a question to counsel during closing 
statements (Tr. 172-173), indicating that the Judge may have had concerns about the 
credibility of the plaintiffs testimony. 
Finally, it should be noted that this action stems from plaintiffs order to 
show cause which was first scheduled before a commissioner and then set for a review 
and trial before Judge Brian. Plaintiffs assertion that the commissioner's findings are the 
"law of the case" and are not changed by Judge Brian's findings after a full evidentiary 
trial is untenable. The Utah Code of Judicial Administration states that "the 
Commissioner's recommendation is the order of the court until modified by the court." 
U.C.J.A. 6-401(4). Plaintiff objected to the commissioner's recommendation, properly 
setting the matter for review before the judge pursuant to U.C.J.A. 6-401(5). 
Accordingly, plaintiff's second hearing before the commissioner while the objection to 
the first recommendation was still unresolved was improper. 
It is the prerogative and, indeed, the duty of a trial court to attribute veracity 
and weight to the testimony of witnesses and the evidence presented during a trial. A trial 
court's determination of a factual issue should not be disturbed on appeal unless the 
determination is clearly erroneous. Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah 1984); Teratron 
General v. Institutional Investorv Trust, 569 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Wash. 1977) (stating that 
"unraveling and deciphering of the evidence is a function of the trial judge, and we will 
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not upset his interpretation of the testimony when any reasonable view substantiates his 
findings even though there may be other reasonable interpretations." (quoting Kaas v. 
Privette, 529 P.2d 23,26 (Wash. 1974)). In the present case, the trial court made a 
reasonable and well-founded decision that the plaintiff received money from the 
defendant for the purpose of paying for her interest in the Company and that such funds 
were sufficient to cover any interest she had been awarded in the Company. This decision 
was based upon on the facts and evidence before the trial court and should not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the trial court's interpretation of the facts was 
clearly erroneous. The court's determination that the plaintiff had been paid for the 
interest awarded to her pursuant to paragraph 3b the Decree should not be disturbed. 
If the trial court's decision on this first issue discussed above is upheld, 
there is no need to address the remaining, secondary, issues on appeal. If the plaintiff was 
paid in 1980 for her interest awarded in paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce, the other 
issues presented on appeal, other than the issue of discovery sanctions, are moot. 
B. Did the Trial Court err when it found that the statute of 
limitations barred plaintiffs action to enforce paragraph 
3b of the Decree of Divorce? 
L The defendant did not waive the affirmative defense of 
statute of limitations or the other affirmative defenses 
alleged to have been waived 
The trial court found that even disregarding its finding that plaintiff was 
paid for her interest in the Company, her action would have been barred by the statute of 
limitations. The arguments on this issue and those that follow assume that these issues 
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need only be addressed if it is determined by the appellate court that the trial court 
committed clear error in finding that plaintiff was paid for her interest in the Company. 
The affirmative defense of statute of limitations was not waived and was a 
proper issue for the trial court to address. The plaintiff cites cases, including Tvgesen v. 
Magna Water Co.. 375 P.2d 456 (Utah 1962) and American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom. 689 
P.2d 1 (Utah 1984), to support her argument that an affirmative defense, specifically, a 
statute of limitations, must be waived if it is not raised in a timely manner. These two 
cases involve situations where the statute of limitations issue was raised for the first time 
upon appeal. Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co.. 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1988) 
involves a case where a party sought to amend his answer to include a statute of 
limitations defense on the morning of trial. These situations are very different from that 
presented in the present case. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that the statute of limitations issue was 
argued before the commissioner on the very first hearing on the law and motion calendar. 
The issue was raised in the defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Order to Show Cause and 
supporting Affidavit, the first documents filed by the defendant. The defendant noted that 
significant time had passed since the entry of the Decree of Divorce and stated that "[t]he 
plaintiff has not, since 1981, made any demand on the defendant for any evidence of 
ownership of Kessimakis Produce, Inc., for financial information, notice of meetings or 
otherwise...." (R. 345). While the defendant did not specifically state the words "Statute 
of Limitation", it should be noted plaintiffs action was a motion brought on the law and 
motion calendar before a commissioner and that such motions and responses are typically 
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not as specifically plead as pleadings such as answers and complaints. In addition, there 
is a reduced time frame for responses in comparison with pleadings such as answers and 
counterclaims. 
It is clear that defendant discussed the significant length of time that had 
passed since the entry of the Decree and plaintiffs failure to act to enforce her interest, 
which the defendant argued had already been purchased. The commissioner's 
recommendation that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs action was a result of his 
review of the defendant's response and affidavit, not an issue that he raised sua sponte 
out-of-the-blue. In any event, plaintiff objected to the recommendation and evidentiary 
hearings and a trial was subsequently held on all issues raised by the parties. 
The purpose of statutes of limitation is to protect parties from the 
difficulties inherent in cases that deal with factual issues that have not occurred in the 
recent past. Staker v. Huntington justified the trial court's refusal to address a new 
defense raised on the day of trial with the following explanation: "Plaintiff's case was not 
subject to the evidentiary difficulties that statutes of limitation are designed to prevent, 
such as lost evidence, faded memories, and absent witnesses." 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 
1983). The difficulties of providing evidence and the discrepancies attributable to faded 
memories that were evident in this case (R. 336, Tr. 91-92, 40-41) are precisely the 
reasons that statutes of limitation exist. Even though the defense could have ideally been 
pled more specifically, there is no question that the statute of limitations was an issue in 
this matter from the very beginning. (R. 336, f 8-12, 16, 17). 
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There was no surprise to the plaintiff. Plaintiff had more than adequate 
time to prepare to meet the statute of limitations defense. In fact, the defense was 
discussed in virtually every argument submitted by the plaintiff in the subsequent 
hearings. The plaintiff was given the opportunity to object to the commissioner's 
recommendation of dismissal and was given every opportunity to prepare for and present 
arguments relating to the statue of limitations issue at subsequent hearings and trial. 
Plaintiff urges an extremely strict application of Rules 8(c) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and a very narrow view of the facts when she asks that the statute of 
limitations be excluded as a proper issue before the court. In Williams v. State Farm Ins. 
Co., 6565 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court specifically addressed Rule 
8(c) among the other rules of civil procedure, stating that 
they must all be looked to in the light of their even more fundamental 
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the 
parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate 
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. What [the parties] are 
entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. 
When this is accomplished, this is all that is required. 
The defendant sufficiently raised the statute of limitations issue at the earliest stages of 
this action. Plaintiff was in no way prejudiced in her opportunity to prepare for and argue 
against the defense. Based upon the facts and the record, Judge Brian correctly ruled that 
defendant did not waive the statute of limitations as a defense to plaintiffs action. 
2. Utah Code Annotated §78-12-22(1) is applicable to a 
property award required to be delivered under the Decree 
The trial court properly ruled that the plaintiffs request to require an 
affirmation and delivery of her interest in the Company was untimely. The trial court 
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properly held that the eight-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated 
§76-12-22(1) applied to paragraph 3b of the Decree of Divorce, and that the plaintiff had 
a duty to act to enforce her award within the eight-year statute of limitations. 
In her brief, plaintiff/appellant presents several cases (Brief of Appellant, 
pp. 12-13) supporting the assertion that Utah courts consider a divorce to be equitable in 
nature. Plaintiff argues that, under U.C.A. §30-4-5 and supporting case law, an appellate 
court has the equitable power to modify a trial court's division of marital property. 
Defendant does not disagree. However, plaintiffs argument is inappropriate. Neither 
party has sought to modify the property award under the Decree. The cases cited by the 
plaintiff involve requests to review a trial court's division of property, an action that was 
taken in this case over twenty years ago. Plaintiff did not request a change in the property 
award and now is not the time to revisit the question of equitable property division. 
Plaintiff cites 27 A CJ.S. Divorce, Section 94 stating that divorce actions 
are not barred by laches if there is a continuing cause of action. This section refers to the 
time for filing an action for divorce, and is not applicable to the issue at hand. 
The Utah Supreme Court determined in 1978, at the conclusion of the 
second appeal of this case, that the property division contained in the Decree of Divorce 
was equitable. No change was made to the Decree. At that point, defendant was obligated 
to "execute and deliver appropriate instruments evidencing the transfer" of plaintiff s 
interest in the Company. (Decree of Divorce, Paragraph 3b, R. 20). If the defendant failed 
to act as ordered, the plaintiff would be obligated to bring an action to enforce her rights 
under the Decree. There is a time limit set for such actions. 
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Utah Code Annotated §78-12-22(1) states that "[a]n action may be brought 
within eight years upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any 
state or territory within the United States." Utah law is clear that awards of alimony and 
child support arrearages are subject to an eight year statute of limitations from the date 
the obligation is incurred. U.C.A. §78-12-22(2); Seelev v. Park. 532 P.2d 684, 685 (Utah 
1975). Plaintiff cites a Florida case, Johnson v. Johnson. 676 So.2d 458 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 
1988), showing that Florida considers alimony and child support to be equitable in nature 
and specifically exempts such obligations from the running of a statute of limitations. 
Although both Utah and Florida consider divorce issues to be basically equitable in 
nature, Utah and other states have chosen not to provide a blanket exemption for child 
support and alimony and subject such awards to a statute of limitations, which in the case 
of Utah, is eight years in length. U.C.A. §78-12-22(2). Section 78-12-22(1) similarly 
applies to judgments in the State of Utah regardless of whether the underlying action is 
equitable in nature or not. 
In Mason v. Mason. 597 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that U.C.A. §78-12-22 barred an ex-spouse's attempt to renew the judgment she 
obtained for past alimony. The court stated: 
the purpose of statutes of limitation is that controversies should not lie 
dormant indefinitely, to spring into life and action at the whim or 
caprice of a claimant, but should sometime come permanently to rest. It 
is for this purpose that the different limitations of the time in which 
various actions may be brought, for example as to real property, written 
contracts, open accounts, liabilities created by statute, etc.... But the 
losing of such causes of action by the lapse of time can be avoided by 
filing an action in court within the period so prescribed. 
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Id. At 1323. As of June 2, 1978, the date of the decision on the second appeal of the 
Decree of Divorce, plaintiff had eight years to enforce the Decree of Divorce in the event 
the defendant failed to execute and deliver instruments evidencing the transfer. 
Plaintiff cites Shill v. ShilL 765 P.2d 140, (Idaho 1988), in support of her 
argument that no statute of limitations should apply, stating that the Idaho Supreme Court 
had not recognized the running of a statute of limitations in a case dealing with failure to 
deliver pension funds awarded by a decree of divorce. (Brief of Appellant, p. 14). 
However, the Shill court was addressing the issue of lack of prosecution, not a statute of 
limitations. That court merely declined to reverse the trial court's decision that there was 
not lack of prosecution, stating that a factual showing of lack of prosecution "is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court." (Id. At 143). The Idaho Supreme Court did not 
address a specific statute of limitations. In fact, it appears that, unlike Utah, the State of 
Idaho does not have a statute of limitations for actions on court orders and decrees. 
In a situation virtually identical to the case at hand, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court held that an Oklahoma statute of limitations barred an action to enforce property 
awards under a Decree of Divorce. In Chapman v. Chapman, 692 P.2d 1369 (Okl. 1984), 
a spouse sought to enforce her decree of divorce which assigned her the balance of a note 
and mortgage. The Oklahoma court denied her cause of action, emphasizing that she 
could have brought actions to enforce her interest and failed to timely do so under both a 
reasonableness standard and an applicable statute of limitation. Id. At 1375. The court 
stated that the party seeking to enforce the decree's property award "could have enforced 
the assignment provision by contempt" , could have "given notice to the obligor and 
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demanded that he make the payments" , or could have "instituted an action against him to 
compel the enforcement of the decree-conferred assignment". Id. Instead, she waited 15 
years to institute an action to compel enforcement of the assignment and the court ruled 
that her claim was barred as untimely. 
It appears that there is no case in this jurisdiction that is directly on point. 
However, the clear language of U.C.A. §78-12-22(1) and established case law dealing 
with similar awards of property and judgments indicate that an accrued interest awarded 
in a Decree of Divorce must be enforced within eight years absent some legally 
recognized justification for delay. The Court should follow the decision of the Oklahoma 
court. Its decision is more consistent with existing Utah law than those decisions 
presented by the plaintiff. The Decree of Divorce awarded an accrued interest to the 
plaintiff and ordered the defendant to "execute and deliver" instruments evidencing that 
interest. (R. 20). The trial court properly ruled that that U.C.A. §78-12-22(1) applies to 
the award, requiring plaintiff to act to enforce the Decree of Divorce within eight years if 
the documents had not been delivered. 
3. The trial court made an appropriate and supportable 
factual finding that defendant's actions did not amount to 
estoppel or a lulling or tolling of the statute of limitations 
Despite the application of the statute of limitations, plaintiff would still be 
entitled to bring an action to enforce the award granted under the Decree of Divorce if 
she could prove estoppel or lulling or tolling of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff was 
unable to establish this before the trial court. The question as to whether an applicable 
statute of limitation was suspended by estoppel, lulled, or tolled, is a question of fact, 
21 
which should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Brower v. Brown. 744 
P.2d 1337, 1338-39 (Utah 1987). 
The trial court had adequate evidence and testimony before it to support its 
finding that there were no facts or actions that constituted an estoppel, lulling, or tolling. 
Plaintiff testified that she occasionally received produce from the defendant and alleged 
that this evidenced her interest in the Company. (Tr. 15, 24). She also presented 
testimony that defendant made promises and delayed delivery of the stock certificates. 
(Tr. 13-14, 21-25, 42-44, 146-47, 152). Contradicting this testimony, defendant testified 
that plaintiff had not asked him for her stock certificates or other evidence of her 
ownership in the Company since 1980. (Tr. 59-60). He testified that she had not asked for 
dividends (Tr. 59), had not asked for corporate records (Tr. 67), and had not otherwise 
sought to participate in the activities of the Company until she filed suit in late 1994. He 
contradicted the plaintiffs testimony, stating that he had never told her he would care for 
her financially or hold her stock ownership for her after the divorce. (Tr. 88). He testified 
that he had never discussed delivery of the stock as she had testified. (Tr. 64). He testified 
that plaintiff had never entered the Company's place of business since the divorce. (Tr. 
64-65). Plaintiff testified that she had been in the Company's previous building since the 
divorce. (Tr. 33). 
The plaintiff testified that the defendant never made a written promise to 
deliver evidence of her interest in the Company. (Tr. 45). She testified that she did not 
believe there was any injunction or other issue that would have precluded her from 
claiming her stock from the date of the divorce. Id. She testified that she never gave the 
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defendant authority or proxy to act on her behalf for the Company and that she had no 
business dealings with the defendant after 1980. (Tr. 47-48). 
Plaintiff testified that she did, however, act judicially to enforce her interest 
in child support. (Tr. 51-53; See also Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah 
1090) (defendant held in contempt of court for child support delinquencies)). The record 
shows that she took no legal action regarding her stock interest until late 1994. 
The trial court had an adequate factual foundation to find that the 
defendant's actions did not amount to estoppel, lulling, or tolling. The court also had 
adequate facts before it to find that plaintiff knew, from the date of the Decree of 
Divorce, that documents evidencing her interest in the Company had not been delivered 
and that she took no steps to enforce either delivery of the documents or her claimed 
interest in the Company's profits and affairs until 20 years after the entry of the Decree. 
C. Did the Trial Court err in failing to address the issue of a 
constructive trust or to find that a constructive existed in 
favor of the plaintiff? 
The trial court did not address the issue of a constructive trust in its findings 
and accordingly did not find that the plaintiff was the beneficiary of a constructive trust 
which would act to hold her interest in the Company in the name of the defendant, 
thereby defeating the statute of limitations. The trial court properly excluded this theory 
in its findings. 
It was not necessary for the trial court to address the constructive trust issue 
in light of the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's interest had been previously 
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purchased by the defendant. Because the trial court found that the plaintiff had already 
been paid for her interest in the Company, the theory of constructive trust was moot. It 
also appears that plaintiff did not emphasize the issue of a constructive trust in her Trial 
Briefs, which very specifically listed several issues, numbering each issue for the Court, 
but mentioned a trust theory only in a footnote (R. 522, fn 2; R. 623, fn 2). 
Even if the trial court had found that the plaintiff was not paid for her 
interest, there was not sufficient evidence to support the theory of a constructive trust. 
The question of whether a constructive trust should be invoked is primarily a question of 
fact. See Close v. Adams, 657 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1983): Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 
1179, (Utah App. 1988) (stating that such a trust must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence). A constructive trust may only be imposed by a court upon a 
showing of fraud or a confidential relationship between the parties. Hawkins v. Perry, 
253 P.2d 372 (Utah 1953). The plaintiff never alleged fraud relating to the failure of 
defendant to deliver, or her failure to exercise, her interest in the Company. A 
confidential relationship requires the exertion of extraordinary influence or power over 
the other party. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); see also Mattes v. 
Olearain, at 1179, (holding that affection, confidence, and trust are not sufficient absent a 
showing of superiority over the other party). An example of successful assertions of a 
constructive trust in Utah involve a sixteen year-old boy and a minister (Hawkins v. 
Perry, 253 P.2d 372 (Utah 1953)) and a husband who used harassment and treats of 
bodily harm and physical abuse to force his spouse to convey property to him (St. Pierre 
v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982)). These elements are not present in this case. 
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The trial court committed no reversible error in failing to address the issue 
of a constructive trust in light of its finding that the defendant purchased the plaintiffs 
interest in the Company. In addition, there was not sufficient factual evidence to support 
the plaintiffs theory. 
D. Did the Trial Court render a decision on an issue not 
presented before it for determination? 
This issue has already been partially addressed in section B1 of the 
argument. That section deals with the issue of the alleged wavier of the statute of 
limitation defense. In that section, defendant has shown that the statute of limitations 
issue was properly before the court and that both the commissioner and the judge were 
justified in finding that it was a valid basis for denial of plaintiffs action. 
Again, plaintiff cites cases that present situations not comparable to the 
case at hand. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 780 P.2d 1264 (Utah App. 1989) and Girard v. Applebv, 
660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983) involve cases where an award of attorney's fees was awarded 
sua sponte despite the fact that there were no arguments on that issue at trial. Combe v. 
Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984) involves a situation where a 
trial court dissolved a corporation and distributed the assets when neither party had asked 
for such an action. Id. at 735. That court held that "[a] court may not grant judgment for 
relief which is neither requested by the pleading nor within the theory on which the case 
was tried." and that "[i]t is error to adjudicate issues not raised before trial and 
unsupported by the record." In the case at hand, the issue of the statute of limitations was 
raised and debated from the beginning. The commissioner's decision was appealed at the 
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request of the plaintiff and the parties were afforded the opportunity of presenting issues, 
arguments, and evidence to the judge at trial before the final decision was rendered. The 
standards set forth in Combe were met. 
Plaintiff also contends that it was improper for the court to dismiss the case 
as no party had requested dismissal. This is not a sustainable argument. Plaintiffs order 
to show cause requested an order "confirming her ownership of such interest in the 
company." (R. 328). The trial court's decision to deny her cause of action was a 
responsive finding that she had no such interest. Defendant's response to plaintiffs order 
to show cause specifically requested that the order to show cause be dismissed. (R. 344). 
The trial court appropriately responded to the relief requested by the parties 
and based its decision on issues raised by the parties and supported by the record. 
E. Should the Defendant be sanctioned for failure to comply 
with discovery requests? 
The issues of discovery were adequately and specifically addressed by the 
trial court in its orders issued in response to defendant's motion for a protective order. 
The trial court issued rulings suspending discovery and then later specifically limited 
discovery to specific issues. Because the trial court found that plaintiff had been paid for 
her interest in the Company and therefore had no current ownership interest, there was no 
obligation to order additional discovery on the matter. 
While the parties were still attempting to resolve the objections to 
plaintiff's proposed order on Commissioner Arnett's recommendation of dismissal, 
plaintiff sent discovery requests to the defendant (R. 404) requesting, among various 
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other things, information on the Company's current finances, assets, and operations. 
Defendant responded to the discovery, and plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Discovery 
(R. 415) claiming that defendant's responses were not adequate. Plaintiff then filed a 
subpoena duces tecum requesting from the defendant records of "any and all stock, and 
any and all record book of the company Kessimakis Produce, Inc." (R. 455). Defendant 
responded to the motion to compel and moved for a protective order requesting limitation 
of the scope of discovery. Defendant's objections were based on the fact that the 
commissioner's recommendation to dismiss the action was currently under review and 
that at that stage in the proceedings, the current assets of the Company were therefore 
irrelevant and protected. (R. 452, 484) 
While a decision on the Motion for a Protective order was pending with the 
Judge, the commissioner ruled on plaintiff's Motion to Compel, finding that the 
discovery responses were not complete. The commissioner did not address defendant's 
motion for a protective order. (R. 479, 514). 
Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order was then heard by Judge Brian, 
who suspended all motions and discovery pending a hearing before him. (R. 520, 531). 
When that hearing was held on December 5, 1996, the court made specific rulings on the 
outstanding discovery issues, ordering discovery on specific, limited issues. (R. 598-601). 
Discovery was had on those issues with both parties providing all information that they 
had under the revised discovery order. After trial, the court held that plaintiff had no 
continuing interest in the Company, rendering any further discovery needless and 
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inappropriate. The defendant has fully complied with the court's discovery requests and 
there are no grounds for sanctions. 
F. Defendant/Appellee is entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees and costs under rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 
In the event of dismissal of this appeal, defendant should be awarded its 
costs and attorneys fees incurred in defending the appeal. 
Pursuant to U.R.A.P. 34, "if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed 
against the appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court." This 
case is an appropriate candidate for an award of costs. The appeal is based primarily 
upon plaintiffs objection to factual findings based upon a trial court's careful 
consideration of the testimony and evidence before it. The appellant has produced no 
credible showing of error in the court's factual findings. 
Appellee is also entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to U.R.A.P. 
33. This appeal is based primarily upon the appellant's dissatisfaction with the trial 
court's factual conclusion. The testimony and evidence of the parties clearly supports the 
trial court's finding that plaintiff was paid for her interest. All other issues are secondary. 
If the trial court's factual finding is upheld, there exists no good faith argument to extend, 
modify, or reverse existing law and the secondary issues are moot. The issue of sanctions 
for discovery is not supported by the face of the record. This appeal is frivolous and 
serves no other purpose than to continue to increase the legal fees and litigation costs of 
the appellee. 
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Appellee should not be penalized financially simply because the appellant 
simply wishes to express dissatisfaction with a trial court's findings by filing an appeal. 
This is especially true where there exists a sold factual and evidentiary basis for the trial 
court's decision. Appellant bears the responsibility for determining whether filing an 
appeal is reasonable and should also bear the financial burden of filing appeals that are 
not grounded upon reasonably sustainable grounds. 
X. CONCLUSION 
This is an appeal based primarily on plaintiff/appellant's disagreement with 
the trial court's factual findings. The appellant has failed to marshal all of the evidence 
to show that the court's findings were clearly erroneous. The testimony before the court 
clearly supports the court's interpretation of the evidence, finding that plaintiff was paid 
for her interest. That finding should not be disturbed. 
If the court's factual findings set forth above are upheld, the issues of the 
statute of limitations and constructive trust are moot because the plaintiff accordingly hac 
no interest to enforce under these theories. If the factual findings of the court are not 
upheld, the plaintiffs arguments on these two issues do not arise to a reversible error for 
the reasons set forth above. In a related question, the court committed no reversible error 
in making its findings. The court did not make a decision on issues not presented to it, 
nor did it make a decision not requested by the parties. 
Finally, there is no evidence that defendant failed to comply with plaintiffs 
discovery requests. The trial court heard the arguments on plaintiffs motion to compel 
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and defendant's motion for a protective order and made an appropriate and specific order 
limiting discovery. The parties complied with this order. There is no sustainable 
argument in support of sanctions against the defendant on discovery issues. 
The trial court's holdings should be affirmed and the appellee should be 
awarded costs and attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of October, 1998. 
^id-
E.NORDELL WEEKS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
&a 
X. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I cause an onginal and seven additional copies of the 
foregoing, pursuant to rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to be filed 
with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. I also certify that I cause two copies thereof to be 
mailed, via United States mail, postage prepaid, on this 6th day of October, 1998, to the 
following address: 
Mitchell R. Barker, Esq. 
Thomas E. Stamos, Esq. 
Attorney's for Plaintiff/Appellant 
3530 South 6000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84128 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J-/3 -7«t - $'5Z A A/f 
BETTY L. KESSIMAKIS, ) 
Plaintiff, ( 
v. ) DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
DALE M. KESSIMAKIS, ( Civil No. D-14107 
Defendant. ) 
The above entitled matter having been heretofore heard and 
the Court having acquired jurisdictation of the Parties and of the subject 
matter of this cause, and having decided the same in accordance with the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on file herein, NOW THEREFORE, 
pursuant to said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant 
on the grounds of mental cruelty, said Decree to become absolute and final 
at the expiration of three (3) months from date of entry of this Decree. 
2 . The Plaintiff Js awarded the sole care, custody and control 
of the minor children of the Parties, subject, however, to rights of visitation 
by the Defendant at reasonable times and places. 
3 . That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and 
separate properties, the following: 
a. Residential dwelling at 4520 Atwood Blvd., Murray, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and more particularly described 
as follows: 
ii>' 
"Beginning at a point on the westerly side of Atwood 
Boulevard, said point being South 3°12,15M East 265,58 
feet and North 39°52'45" East 825.18 to a County Monument 
at the intersection of 4500 South and State Street, North 
89°5r East along the 4500 South Street monument Line 1437.07 
feet, South 0°02'45" West parallel with State Street 200 feet 
and South 89°51' West 6.97 feet from the West 1/4 corner of 
Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; thence South 1°58'45" West along the West side 
of Atwood Boulevard 90.46 feet; thence South 89° 51' West 
170.63 feet; thence North 0°02*45" East 76.9 feet; thence 
North 89°51' East 80.65 feet; thence North 0°or45MEast 13.5 
feet; thence North 89°5' East 93.03 feet to the point of 
beginning." 
together with all of the furniture, contents and appliances 
contained in said family residence; 
b. One-Half (1/2) of Defendant's interest in 
Kessimakis Produce, Inc., whether the same be evidenced by 
stock certificate or otherwise and the Defendant is ordered to 
execute and deliver appropriate instruments evidencing the 
transfer of such interest; 
c . One (1) 1969 Oldsmobile automobile presently 
in the possession of the Plaintiff; 
d. Personal effects, clothing and such items of 
personalty as Plaintiff is in possession of. 
4 . That the Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate 
property, the following: 
a. His personal clothing and effects; 
b. One-Half (1/2) of the interest acquired by the 
Defendant in Kessimakis Produce, Inc.; 
c . Such other items of personalty now in his 
possession except as awarded to the Plaintiff hereinabove. 
5. That the Defendant is ordered and required to pay to the 
Plaintiff as support of the three (3) minor children of the Parties the sum of 
One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per child per month from and after entry of 
this Decree. 
- 2 -
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6. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded alimony in the sum of 
Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, which the Defendant is ordered 
and required to pay. 
7. Defendant is ordered and required to pay all debts and 
obligations incurred by the Parties during the course of the marriage 
including the assumption and payment of the mortgage balances owing on the 
family residence described hereinabove. 
8. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against the Defendant for 
attorney's fees incurred herein in the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) 
together with costs of this action. 
DATED, this <*" day of August, 1974. 
BY THE COURT: 
CiJ?R£ 
/ - d /' '"? M 
C j U D G E 
TabB 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
165 South West Temple, # 4 00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 486-9638 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY L. KESSIMAKIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE M. KESSIMAKIS, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE, FOR CONTEMPT, FOR 
JUDGMENT AND TO REQUIRE PAYMENT 
OR PROPERTY CONVEYANCE 
Civil No. D 14107 (DA) 
Judge 3s*~'* ^ 
Plaintiff Betty L. Kessimakis, through counsel, respectfully 
moves the Court for an order as follows: 
1. Awarding her money judgment against defendant Dale M. 
Kessimakis for the value of her interest in the business, 
Kessimakis Produce Company; 
2. Fixing the amount or value of her interest in the company 
and its assets, by evidentiary hearing if necessary; 
3. Confirming her ownership of such interest in the company; 
4. Compelling defendant to buy out and pay her for her 
interest; 
MOTi * F?R ORDER TO .-HOW CAUSE, 1 
5. Finding him in contempt of Court for failure to convey to 
her the appropriate interest prior to now; 
6. Order a business appraisal of Kessimakis Produce Company 
at defendant's expense; 
7. Ordering payment to plaintiff of suit money in the sum of 
$2,000; 
8. Authorizing the employment of a certified public 
accountant to assist plaintiff in this matter, with the cost and 
initial retainer to be borne by defendant; 
9. Awarding attorney fees and costs and such other relief as 
the Court deems appropriate; and 
10. Requiring defendant Dale Kessimakis to appear before the 
Court at a time and place convenient to the Court, then and there 
to show cause, if any he has, why the above relief should not be 
granted to the plaintiff. 
Respectfully so moved this 10th day of November, 1994. 
Mitchell R. Barker, attorney for 
Betty Kessimakis, Plaintiff 
TabC 
E. NORDELL WEEKS (3412) 
Attorney for Defendant 
320 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 322-2800 
flUDDBTWCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 1 9 1995 
/^AtT LAKE COUNTY 
OcputyCJwfc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY KESSIMAKIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE KESSIMAKIS, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE 
li 
Civil No. D 14107 DA 
Judge _X 
) r 
) W ^ 
COMES NOW the defendant, DALE M. KESSIMAKIS, by 
and through his undersigned counsel, E. NORDELL WEEKS, and 
hereby files this response to the plaintiff's Motion for 
Order to Show Cause. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Decree of Divorce in this matter was entered 
on August 18, 1974. The plaintiff, at that time, was 
awarded a one-half interest in whatever ownership interest 
the defendant had in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., a Utah 
corporation. Kessimakis Produce, Inc., was incorporated 
on November 12, 1973. The defendant owned a total of six 
thousand (6,000) of the thirty thousand (30,000) shares of 
outstanding stock in the corporation at the time of entry 
of the Decree of Divorce. 
,vV 
Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce 
herein, the plaintiff is believed to have received, in 
1976f from Kessimakis Produce Inc.f a stock certificate 
for three thousand (3,000) shares of Kessimakis Produce, 
Inc. 
Thereafter, the defendant, in 1981 or 1982, 
purchased the stock of the plaintiff in Kessimakis 
Produce, Inc., for a payment in excess of Twenty Thousand 
Dollars ($20,000.00). 
ARGUMENT 
The defendant, because of passage of time, has 
not been able to locate the corporate records or his 
personal financial records for the period of time 1980 
through 1982, to document that payment has been made. 
Certain of the corporation's legal counsel and 
accountants for the period 1976 through 1982, are now 
deceased and records have been difficult to obtain. 
The plaintiff has not, since 1981, made any 
demand on the defendant for any evidence of ownership of 
Kessimakis Produce, Inc., for financial information, 
notice of meetings or otherwise, because she has received 
full payment for her interest in the business and knew she 
had no on-going ownership interest in Kessimakis Produce, 
Inc. 
The defendant has served discovery documents on 
the plaintiff to obtain her financial records to document 
the payment for the stock of Kessimakis Produce, Inc. 
2 
The Motion for Order to Show Cause was filed by 
the plaintiff to vex, harass and annoy the defendant. 
Even assuming that the defendant has not paid the 
plaintiff (which is disputed), the plaintiff has asked for 
relief not provided in the Decree of Divorce and seeks 
modification of the Decree of Divorce which cannot be 
accomplished by means of an Order to Show Cause. 
The defendant was never ordered in the Decree of 
Divorce to determine the value of plaintiff's interest in 
Kessimakis Produce, Inc., or to purchase the plaintiff's 
interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order should be denied or the matter set for 
evidentiary hearing. 
The defendant should be awarded his attorney's 
fees incurred herein. 
DATED this /1' day of January, 1995. 
E. NORDELL WEEKS 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to: 
Mitchell R. Barker, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3530 South 6000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
3 
by United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, this (U)J> 
day of January, 1995. 
vt/t^ hfflk 
W.mw9-KESSIMAKIS. RESPONSE 
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E. NORDELL WEEKS (3412) 
Attorney for Defendant 
320 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 322-2800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY KESSIMAKIS, 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, ) DALE KESSIMAKIS 
vs. ) 7V 
) Civil No. D 14107 DA 
DALE KESSIMAKIS, ) -p 
) Judge *VK.lce<.^—-
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DALE KESSIMAKIS, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. I am the defendant in the above-captioned 
matter. 
2. Kessimakis Produce, Inc., was incorporated on 
November 12, 1973 (see Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by 
reference made a part hereof). 
3. The plaintiff was awarded one-half of any 
interest I owned in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., as of the 
date of entry of the Decree of Divorce on August 18, 1974. 
nUBDtSTWCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 1 9 1995 
S^kTLAKECQrJNTY 
OapuyCMc 
4. At the time the Decree of Divorce was 
entered, I owned twenty percent (20%) of Kessimakis 
Produce, Inc., represented by six thousand (6,000) shares 
(see Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by reference made a 
part hereof). 
5. Upon information and belief, a stock 
certificate was delivered to the plaintiff in the spring 
of 1976 in the amount of three thousand (3,000) shares, 
representing ten percent (10%) of the stock ownership of 
Kessimakis Produce, Inc. 
6. I received a replacement stock certificate 
for three thousand (3,000) shares representing my ten 
percent (10%) ownership interest in Kessimakis Produce, 
Inc. 
7. In or about 1981 or 1982, I paid to the 
plaintiff the sum of approximately Twenty-one Thousand 
Dollars ($21,000.00) or Twenty-two Thousand Dollars 
($22,000.00) for the purchase of her interest in 
Kessimakis Produce, Inc. 
8. I have been unable to locate the corporate 
records which document the issuance of the stock 
certificate in Kessimakis Produce, Inc. 
9. The corporation has had three attorneys since 
1974, of which two are deceased and the other does not 
have any corporate records. 
10. The present accountant for the corporation, 
Michael Smith, was searching for the corporate records of 
2 
Kessimakis Produce, Inc., to assist in responses to the 
plaintiff's Motion herein, but passed away unexpectedly on 
January 12, 1995, and the officers and directors of the 
corporation have not been able to verify whether or not 
the corporate records regarding stock certificates were in 
his possession (see Exhibit "C" attached hereto and by 
reference made a part hereof). 
11. I have not been able to locate my financial 
records for the 1981 and 1982 periods to determine the 
date and amounts paid to the plaintiff for her stock. 
12. I believe that the plaintiff will have 
deposit slips, stock purchase documents or other financial 
records for 1981 and 1982 which will document that she 
received sums from me in excess of $20,000.00, for her 
interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc. 
13. I have, through my counsel, served discovery 
on the plaintiff, seeking her records for the periods in 
question. 
14. The plaintiff never returned to me her stock 
certificate for 3,000 shares of stock of Kessimakis 
Produce, Inc. 
15. The plaintiff has never made any demand on 
me since 1981, for the purchase of her stock or evidence 
of her ownership, since she had received full payment for 
the stock of Kessimakis Produce, Inc., in 1981 or 1982. 
16. The defendant has never demanded any 
financial information or notice of meetings on Kessimakis 
3 
Produce, Inc., since 1981, as she was aware she held no 
interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc. 
17. This action is without merit and is intended 
to harass me. 
18. I have found it necessary to retain an 
attorney to defend me in this action. 
18. The plaintiff should be ordered to pay my 
attorney's fees incurred in defending this action. 
this //l - day of January, 1995. DATED 
XV^V 
DALE KESSIMAKIS 
SUBSCRIBED, sworn to and acknowledged before me 
this ///;M day of January, 1995, by DALE KESSIMAKIS. 
s / 
NOrAHY I'Uli' 1C 
WENDY K. ROSE 
320 Ktamt Building 
I Lak* city. Utah $4101 
My Committioft Expires 
PfQVMRBtf 1. 1090 
•TATE OF UTAH 
/ ' • ' ' ^ / ^ 
NC/fARY PUBLIC 
W .BW9-KESSIMAKIS. AFF 
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Nov. 19f 19 - Mailed Corporation Charter to Keith Da lson. 
November 12, 1973 
Mr, Keith Dennison 
Arch Accounting Service 
190 West 2950 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah &U115 
Re: Utah Incorporation Of: 
Kessimakia Produce, Ino, 
Dear Keith: 
Piled Articles of Incorporation with the Utah Secretary of 
State today. Charter will be mailed to my office In about one 
week. ~cu should contact the Utah Tax Commission about license, 
etc* 
Costs expended by ne are as follows, vouchers enclosed: 
!• Secretary of State- Piling Pee 
2* lastats- for 9 photocopies of Articles 
TOTAL DUE 
$75.00 
Please have Hike send me his check for the above amountm 
Enclosed $ photocopies of Articles of Incorporation, 2 of 
which should be kept in your office, since you will do all the 
book work, and 1 given to Hike, Dale and Gary Kessimakia. 
If you have any questions, please call roe. 
With kind regards, I am, 
ATD/md 
Enclosures 
EXHIBIT "A" 
,&z 
MHIUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE INCORPORATORS AND SUBSCRIBERS OF 
KESSIMAKIS PRODUCE, INC, k3^0 ATWOOD BLVD., MURRAY, UTAH 8*fl07, 
held at 5*f6 West 6th South in the city of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on the 12th day of November, 1973 at h o'clock in the 
afternoon. 
Mr. Mike Kessimakis, a subscriber to the Certificate of Incorporation of 
this corporation called the meeting to order. 
On motion duly made, seconded and carried, Mr. Mike Kessimakis was 
elected chairman of the meeting, and Mr. Gary Kessimakis secretary thereof. 
Both these gentlemen accepted their respective offices, and proceeded 
with the discharge of their duties. The Secretary then called the roll and 
found that the following incorporators and subscribers to the capital stock 
were present in person: 
None Address Number of shares 
Mike Kessimakis 5^**0 Atwood Boulevard 18,000 
Murray, Utah 8^107 
Gary Kessimakis ^5^0 Atwood Boulevard 6,000 
Murray, Utah 8^107 
Dale Kessimakis ^520 -Atwood Boulevard 6,000 
Murray, Utah 8^107 
The Secretary then presented and read to the Meeting a copy of the 
Certificate of Incorporation of the Company and reported that on the 
12th Day of November, 1973* the original thereof was duly filed and 
recorded in the office of the Secretary of State, that the organization 
tax had been duly paid and that a receipt therefore had been issued by 
the Secretary of State on the 12th day of November, 1973 and that a 
photostatic copy of said Certificate had been duly filed in the office 
of the Clerk of the County of Salt Lake. 
Upon motion duly made and carried, it was resolved that said report 
be accepted as correct, and the Secretary directed to spread a copy of 
such certificate and receipt at length upon the minutes of this meeting. 
As prescribed by articles X and XI of the articles of Incorporation 
election of officers and directors were voted upon with the following being 
duly elected: 
Name 
. Kike ?Iessimakis kjkO Atwood Boulevard Pres ident & Direc tor 
Murray, Utah 8^107 
EXHIBIT "B" A 
Dale Kessiraakis ^520 Atv/ood Boulevard Vice President & Directc 
Murray, Utah 8*fl07 
Gary Kessiamkis ^5^0 Atvcod Boulevard Secretary, Treasurer 
Murray, Utah 8^107 & Director 
Therebeing no further business before the meeting, the same was, on 
motion, duly adjourned. Dated, the 12th day of November, 1972. 
Secre/Baryi of Meeting 
Chairman of Meeting 
vA 
W. Michael Smith 
William Michael Smith, age 57, passed away 
January 12,1995 In Murray, Utah. 
Bom May 24, 1937 in 
Salt Lake City, Utah to Ar-
chibald Theron and 
Kathryn Young Smith. 
Married Sharon Ruth 
Park January 17. 1958, 
Salt Lake Temple. An ac-
tive member of the LDS 
Riverside 1st Ward, he 
loved music and served 
as the ward organist. 
Worked in the baptistery 
at the Jordan River Tem-
ple. He was self-em-
ployed as a CPA. Mem-
ber of the Optimist Club 
and the USPA. 
Survived by wife, Sharon; children, Sherry (Kel-
ly) Johnson; Meiante Stevens; Miriam (Darren) 
Lee; David P. (Heather) Smith; brother, Richard. 
Smith; sisters: Margaret "Peggy* Denison; Janet 
Noorda nine grandchtklren; and many nieces 
and nephews. Preceded in death by his parents 
and granddaughter, Kka 
Funeral services will be held Monday, January 
16,1995.12nooaat the Riverside 1st Ward. 5426 
So. 600 West, Murray, Utah. Friends may call Sun-
day evening from 6-8 p m at Larkin Mortuary, 
260 East South Temple, and at the ward on Mon-
day one hour pnor to services. Interment, Larkin 
Sunset Gardens Cemetery. 
T 1/14 N 1/14 
EXHIBIT "C1 
TabD 
ARTICLE 2 
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY 
78-12-22. Within eight years. 
An action may be brought within eight years: 
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the 
United States, or of any state or territory within the 
United States; 
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become due, for 
failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent 
children- 1996 
TabE 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KESSIMAKIS, BETTY L 
VS 
KESSIMAKIS, DALE M 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION HEARING 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. BARKER, MITCHELL R. 
D. ATTY. WEEKS, E. NORDELL 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 744914107 DA 
DATE 01/19/95 
HONORABLE THOMAS N. ARNETT 
COURT REPORTER TAPE 2-1:05-3:90 
COURT CLERK KAD 
BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JUR-
ISDICTION AND THIS MATTER IS THEREFORE DISMISSED. 
TabF 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3530 South 6000 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120 
Telephone (801) 963-6558 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY L KESSIMAKIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE M. KESSIMAKIS, 
Defendant. 
On December 13, 1995 this matter came before the Court pursuant to notice, with the 
Honorable Pat Brian. Third District Judge, presiding. Plaintiff Betty Kessimakis appeared through 
her counsel. Mitchell R Barker Defendant Dale Kessimakis appeared personally and through his 
counsel, E Nordell Weeks. 
.After having heard brief arguments from respective counsel, and having reviewed the various 
issues and factual disputes pending in this matter, and respective counsel having stipulated to a 
hearing, and good cause appearing, it is now therefore 
ORDERED as follows: 
1. The parties and their counsel shall appear before this Court on February 7, 1996 at 1:00 
p m., for an Evidentiary Hearing and argument. 
FEB 9 1996 
*-n 
"" beputy Cleric 
ORDER , . _ 
Civil No. P-l H07 (DA) 
Judge Brian 
Commissioner Arnett 
2. The Motion for a Protective Order relating to the Subpoena served upon Kessimakis 
Produce, Inc. Is not currently before this Court. 
3. At the February hearing, this Court will take evidence and hear arguments on the facts 
relating to the applicability of the statute of limitations and other issues which are before this Court. 
4. Between now and the February hearing, all current outstanding motions and discovery are 
suspended. However, the parties may submit a summary to the Court of the matters which they wish 
to have determined at the February hearing. J A y/^Y 
So ORDERED this fl day of J $ W ^ 1 9 9 6 / 
BY THE CO 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Third District Court Judge 
Approved: 
E. Nordell Weeks or Eric Weeks 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l ccrtiiv that on the 17th du\ of Januan 19% I mailed a cop\ of the foregoing to the following individual at the 
addie^ indicated In poMaiic piepaid mail 
Noidell WeeLv Lsq 
brie Weeks. Esq 
320 Keams Building 
136 South Main #320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
z*# 
Mitchell R. Barker 
JitMomaJuA, o j\,<Jkjwmaru&, uxcwi. 
/ ^ - * _ l 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KESSIMAKIS, BETTY L 
VS 
KESSIMAKIS, DALE M 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 744914107 DA 
DATE 04/16/96 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
COURT REPORTER BRAD YOUNG 
COURT CLERK BHA 
TYPE OF HEARING: HEARING 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. BARKER, MITCHELL R. 
D. ATTY. WEEKS, NORDELL E 
THE MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT FOR RULING RE: DEF'S MOTION 
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER. THE COURT RULES THAT THE PLF'S COLLECTION 
ACTION IS BARRED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT TIMELY FILED WITHIN THE 
8-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TIME. COUNSEL FOR DEF IS TO 
PREPARE THE FINDINGS AND ORDER AND SUBMIT TO THE COURT BY 5/1/96 
TabH 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 1 0 1997 
Deputy Carx * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY L. KESSIMAKIS, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER 
vs. 
Civil No. D-14107(DA) 
DALE M. KESSIMAKIS, 744910137 7 ^ 7 9 / ' / /£ '7 
Defendant. Commissioner Arnett 
Judge: Brian 
On December 5, 1996 the above matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing on 
the issues related to the availability of the statute of limitations defense. The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
was presiding. Plaintiff Betty Kessimakis appeared personally, and through her counsel, Mitchell 
R. Barker. Defendant Dale M. Kessimakis appeared personally, and through his counsel, Nordell 
Weeks and Eric Weeks. 
The Court convened a pre-trial conference in chambers at the time appointed for trial. The 
in chambers conference involved all of the above parties and counsel. 
The Court having heard proffers in chambers, and having been newly shown stock trading 
confirmation documents, which were brought to the attention of the Court and of plaintiff for first 
time in chambers, entered certain rulings. 
Thereafter, a proposed Order was submitted by counsel for plaintiff, to which an objection 
Kessimakis vs. Kessimakis, 1 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3530 South 6000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84128-2610 
Telephone: (801) 963-6558 
was filed by the defendant, and deemed timely. The Court engaged both counsel in a conference 
call, and sustained said objection. 
Thereafter, a second proposed Order was submitted by plaintiffs counsel, to which an 
objection was also filed by the defendant. The Court engaged both counsel in another conference 
call on January 28, 1997, and sustained the objection. This Order is to comport with that ruling. 
Now, good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED as follows: 
1. The trial is continued to March 11, 1997 at 1:00 p.m., which is a second place setting 
before Judge Brian. 
2. The Court finds that the plaintiff did not file her order to show cause within the eight 
years permitted to enforce a judgement. However, the Court reserves for decision at the upcoming 
trial the issues of whether tolling, lulling or other equitable exceptions to the statute of limitations 
may apply. 
3. The Court rules that the defendant did not waive the statute of limitations as a 
defense in response to the Order to Show Cause in this matter and that the statute of limitations bars 
the plaintiffs action absent conduct of the defendant in the nature of tolling, lulling, or other 
prejudicial conduct. 
4. Among other things, the Court orders that the parties provide evidence at the trial as 
to the Wilson-Davis joint stock account, including when it was opened, why it was opened, who was 
involved, how much money was contributed by each of the parties, how much money was generated 
Kessimakis vs. Kessimakis. 2 
by the account, what happened to the money in the account when it was closed, why it was closed, 
and why the parties do not do business together at this time. 
5. Between now and trial the parties may conduct discovery on the above issues and 
others, with a discovery cut off date of March 1, 1997. Included in the discovery may be the 
taking of the deposition of plaintiffs brother, Mr. Les Anderton, by the defendant, and the taking 
of the depositions of each of the parties by the opposing party. 
6. By January 15, 1997 each of the parties is ordered to produce, through respective 
counsel, a complete copy of his or her 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982 federal income tax report. 
7. Both parties shall produce for one another copies of all records in their control 
which relate to the joint Wilson-Davis account and, to the extent available, any other stock trading 
accounts which were active during 1979 through 1982. 
8. Defendant is ordered to produce by January 15, 1997 a copy of any Will and other 
testamentary document in existence which was prepared by or on behalf of Mike Kessimakis, who 
is deceased, or which disposes of or purports to dispose of any part of his estate. 
9. The issue of attorney fees claimed by plaintiff, including those related to discovery, 
as well as attorney fees claimed by defendant, are reserved for trial. 
SO ORDERED t h i y ^ d a y of J^ ji&afy, 1 ^ 
BY THE COURT: 
1 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
Kessimakis vs. 
s\f\ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on January 28, 1997,1 faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to the following individual: 
Nordell Weeks, Esq. 
320 Kearns Building 
136 South Main #320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Kessimakis vs. Kessimakis, 4 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - ^ i J ^ ^ J -
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY KESSIMAKIS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE KESSIMAKIS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. BJJJ'Q-7 DA 
DATE: 
JUDGE. 
9 OCT. 1997 
PAT B. BRIAN 
This matter came before the Court at trial on October 2, 1997 before the Honorable Pat B 
Brian, District Court Judge, the Court sitting without a jury. The plaintiff Betty Kessimakis 
appeared in person and was represented by counsel Mitchell R. Barker. The defendant Dale 
Kessimakis appeared in person and was represented by counsel E. Nordell Weeks. 
FINDINGS 
1. The Decree of Divorce between the parties was entered on April 7, 1975. 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, the plaintiff was awarded (among other assets) 
"One-half QA) of the interest acquired by the defendant in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., whether the 
same be evidenced by stock certificate or otherwise" and was ordered to "execute and deliver 
appropriate instruments evidencing the transfer of such interest." 
3. Although appealed to the Utah Supreme Court twice (Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 
546 P 2d 888 (Utah 1976); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978)), the Decree of 
1 
Divorce was not modified. 
4. On November 11, 1994, the plaintiff filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause 
seeking (I) a money judgment against the defendant for the value of her interest in Kessimakis 
Produce (hereinafter the "Business"), (ii) an order fixing the amount or value of her interest in the 
Business, (iii) an order confirming her ownership of an interest in the Business, (iv) an order 
compelling the defendant to buy out her interest in the Business, (v) an order finding the 
defendant in contempt for failure to convey her interest prior to the Motion, (vi) an order for 
appraisal of the Business, (vii) a request for court costs, (viii) a request for costs for a Certified 
Public Accountant to assist in fixing her amount of interest in the Business, and (ix) attorney's 
fees. 
5. The above-stated Motion for an Order to Show Cause was the first legal action by 
the plaintiff for enforcement of, affirmation of, or recovery of the assets awarded in the Divorce 
Decree 
6. The plaintiff had continuing knowledge that the defendant had not delivered 
instruments evidencing the transfer of an interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc. 
7. The plaintiff failed to attend or request to attend any stockholder's meetings of 
Kessimakis Produce, Inc. during all of the period subsequent to the entry of the Decree. 
8. Prior to November 11, 1994, the plaintiff failed to make any written or verbal 
demand upon the company or to take any other meaningful action to exercise or demonstrate her 
right of stock ownership or to request delivery of instruments evidencing such ownership. 
9. The defendant and plaintiff had communication with each other during all of the 
2 
years since entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
10. The defendant did not make representations or promises regarding the delivery of 
the assets of the marriage which would constitute tolling, lulling, or a stay of the statute of 
limitation. 
11. The plaintiff and defendant jointly managed a joint trading account in 1980 from 
which both parties could draw funds. 
12. The defendant and the plaintiff established the joint stock trading account as a 
device whereby the defendant paid the plaintiff in excess of $20,000 for her stock interest in 
Kessimakis Produce, Inc. 
13. The plaintiff failed to take any action to recover the joint stock trading account 
funds she asserts were converted to his use upon closing the account. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The statute of limitation set forth in Utah Code Annotated §78-12-22(1) applies to 
the matter before the Court. 
2. The defendant has not waived the statute of limitations defense, nor has he waived 
his affirmative defenses for payment, release, accord and satisfaction, or novation. Testimony and 
evidence in the pleadings and affidavits submitted by counsel and the parties show that these 
issues were raised in a timely manner. 
3. The eight-year statute of limitation set forth in Utah Code Annotated §78-12-22(1) 
began to run on June 2, 1978, the date of the conclusion of the second appeal on the Decree of 
3 
Divorce. 
4. None of the defendant's conduct served to lull or otherwise toll or stay the statute 
of limitation period. 
5. The plaintiff had eight years, absent a sustainable defense to the running of the 
statute of limitation, to bring an action to compel receipt of title to stock in the corporation and 
enforce the Decree. 
6. The plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show Cause (which was filed on November 11, 
1994) constitutes an "action" under the language of Utah Code §78-12-22(1) and was an attempt 
to enforce the Decree of Divorce. 
7. The plaintiff failed to commence an action for enforcement of or execution on her 
judgment awarded by the Decree of Divorce until she filed her Motion for an Order to Show 
Cause on November 11, 1994. 
8. Plaintiffs action is untimely based on the statute of limitation and the facts, 
evidence, and testimony presented to the Court. 
9. Utah Code §78-12-22(1) is applicable to the matter at hand and bars the plaintiffs 
Motion. 
10. The facts and testimony indicate that the defendant did not waive the statute of 
limitation defense or his affirmative defenses of payment, release, accord and satisfaction, or 
novation. 
11. The facts and testimony indicate that the plaintiffs conduct has not constituted a 
4 
lulling or otherwise toll of the statute of limitation period. 
12. The facts and testimony indicate that the judgment contained in the Decree of 
Divorce entered herein has not been stayed, lulled, or tolled. 
13. The facts and testimony indicate that the plaintiff does not have a claim for laches 
as relates to the statute of limitation period. 
14. The court is persuaded that in 1980 the plaintiff either received payment for the 
awarded interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc. or had the legal right to either contest the 
defendant's claim of payment or act to bring action to enforce the award granted in the Divorce 
Decree. 
15. The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence and testimony to show that the 
plaintiff was paid for her interest and in the less likely event that she was not bought out, she has 
failed to contest the payment or enforce the rights under the Decree of Divorce within the statute 
of limitation by failing to bring any action to enforce the Decree until November 11, 1994, nearly 
14 years later. 
16. The plaintiffs cause of action relating to her affirmation of, collection of, request 
for delivery of instruments evidencing ownership of, or any other action relating to enforcing the 
Decree's award of "One-Half (Vi) of the interest acquired by the Defendant in Kessimakis 
Produce, Inc." is barred. 
17. The plaintiffs contention that defendant should be held in contempt for failure to 
comply with plaintiffs discovery requests is without merit. Pursuant to the order of this Court at 
a meeting with the parties, all ongoing discovery was stayed and the parties were ordered to 
5 
produce specific documents requested by this Court. 
DATED this
 f'7 day of (0 T' A/<U>.,1997 
BY THE COURT: 
< £ - ^ U 
PAT B. BRIAN, JUDGE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of , 1997,1 caused to be mailed, first 
class postage prepaid, a true copy of the foregoing ORDER to: 
MITCHEL R. BARKER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
3530 South 6000 West 
West Valley City, UT 84120-2610 
E. NORDELL WEEKS 
ERIC N. WEEKS 
WEEKS LAW FIRM 
320 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DATED this day of , 1997 
Clerk 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT / ? .':•:'/ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH s , , 
j 
BETTY KESSIMAKIS, ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE KESSIMAKIS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 
DATE: 
JUDGE: 
D-44W-7DA 
9 OCT. 1997 
PAT B. BRIAN 
THIS MATTER was called and heard at trial before the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, District Court Judge, sitting without a jury. The plaintiff, Betty Kessimakis, appeared in 
person and was represented by counsel, Mitchell R. Barker. The defendant, Dale Kessimakis, 
appeared in person and was represented by counsel, E. Nordell Weeks. The Court, having heard 
the arguments, testimony, and evidence presented by the parties and witnesses, and having 
conducted a review of the applicable law, legal precedent, and documents and pleadings on file 
herein, and being fully advised thereto, having previously entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs action for enforcement of the Decree of Divorce is untimely and is 
1 
» **> A 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Plaintiff has no ownership interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc. 
MADE AND ENTERED this / ? day of October, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE PATBTBRIAN ^ > 
District Court Judge 
•^t <<a^-
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THE COURT: You may step down. 
Any other witness? 
MR. BARKER: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You rest? 
MR. BARKER: I do. 
THE COURT: Counsel, call your witness. 
MR. WEEKS: Like to call Dale 
Kessimakis, please. 
DALE KESSIMAKIS. 
called as a witness by the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WEEKS: 
Q. Mr. Kessimakis, please state your name a 
address, please. 
A. Dale Kessimakis. I live at 10980 South 
1300 East, Sandy, Utah. 
Q. Where are you employed, Mr. Kessimakis? 
A. Kessimakis Produce. 
Q. It is true, I guess, that you had a 
difficult divorce? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that you subsequently went to the 
Supreme Court a couple of times? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you continue to have difficult times 
with your ex-wife? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What kind of relationship did you have? 
A. It was on and off. Mostly not that good. 
Q. What was the relationship right after you 
finished in the court actions? 
A. We didnft really get along that good right 
after the divorce. 
Q. For how many years after? 
A. Oh, I would say probably a couple of years. 
Q. Did you ever make an attempt in the period 
after the Court actions to reconcile? 
A. No. 
Q. Did your father, Mike, like your former 
wife? 
A. No, he did not. 
Q# Had he ever indicated to you that he wanted 
to see that she was protected? 
A. Never. He never thought very much of 
Betty. 
Q. What was the impetus to try and buy her out 
of the -- of her interest in the company? 
A. Well, I opened the stock account, and with 
some help from my father and some other income that I 
55 
had, I put some money into the stock market, along 
with Betty, and it was our agreement that I would buy 
her out for $25,000 for her share of the Kessimakis 
Produce. 
Q. Was your father the instigator of that 
joint account? 
A. Pardon? 
Q. Was your father the instigator of that 
account? 
A. No. 
Q. But he did help you fund it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the purpose of it was to buy out her 
interest? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you think the company was worth in 
1980? 
A. I would say probably $10,000 to $15,000. 
Q. Your share in it? 
A. That's the total amount. 
Q. That it would have been worth? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. So it was just a family business? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have discussions with Betty about 
56 
the opening of that account? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where were the discussions held? 
A. I think she stopped over at my place. 
Q. Did you discuss this plan to buy her out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did she say? 
A. She said that was fine. 
Q. Was there a reason why you put the stock 
account in one stock brokerage as opposed to another? 
A. Well, Les was the brother, and I figured 
that he would do a real good job, because he was 
investing for both of us. 
Q. That was Les Anderton? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why was her name put on the joint account 
with you? 
A. Well, she was — I really don't know why, 
to tell you the truth. 
Q. Was that the suggestion of someone, I 
guess? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did the account go to her, the account 
mailings, did that information go to her? 
A. Yes. And I think I received some, too. 
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Q. Did she have the authority to trade in the 
account, buy and sell? 
A. Not to my knowledge. Les usually took care 
of most of the buying and selling. 
Q. So he handled it, but she had the authority 
to pick stocks? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did she do that? 
A. I really don't remember. Not to my 
knowledge. 
Q. So it was an account that either one of you 
could have access to? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Could she have taken money out? 
A. She could have. 
Q. Do you know if she took money out? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. How did the money come out of the account? 
A. Les would sell stocks, and then he would 
send me the checks. 
Q. Then what would you do with the checks? 
A. I would cash them. 
Q. Then give them to her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you paid her in cash? 
$8 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has that always been your practice? 
A. Yes. I always pay cash for everything. 
Q. Have you ever paid alimony in anything but 
cash? 
A. I pay alimony and everything in cash. 
Q. Have you recently changed your practice of 
paying other than cash on alimony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you do that? 
A. After the lawsuit. 
Q. Before that you had never paid anything by 
check? 
A. No, always cash. 
Q. So you have no check records at all? 
A. No. 
Q. Betty knew that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you would get money out of the joint 
account, and it would go to Betty as cash? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you paid it to her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you pay her all of the proceeds of that 
account? 
5 
A. She got approximately $25,000. 
Q. And the rest, you got? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was pursuant to your arrangement with 
her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did she ever make demand on you for the 
proceeds of that joint account? 
A. No. 
Q. She has never said anything about it until 
the last couple of years? 
A. She has never said anything. 
Q. Was that your understanding that she was 
being paid for her stock in Kessimakis Produce? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Did she ever, since 1980, ask you for stock 
in Kessimakis? 
A. No, she never has. 
Q. She has never said to you, "When am I going 
to get my stock?" 
A. Never. 
Q. Never said, "When do I get my dividends?" 
A. Never. She has never even spoken about 
dividends, ever. 
Q. Ever talked about getting stock 
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certificates or going to meetings? 
A. No, nothing. 
Q. This account was not set up to try and 
reconcile the marriage? 
A. No. 
Q. You were living with someone else? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I direct your attention to Exhibit A, and 
ask you if you are familiar with that stock trading 
account, and the accounting that's with that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you prepare the little, hard-copy pages 
that are attached to that, that shows the profits and 
losses? 
A. My girlfriend, my former girlfriend, did 
that. 
Q. She did that at the time the account 
trading was going on? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She did that under your instructions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As the trades were made? 
A. Yes. 
MR. WEEKS: I would like to move for 
admission of Exhibit A. 
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THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. BARKER: I need to look at it, I 
guess, based on what was just testified to. 
I wasn't aware there was a summary attached. 
THE COURT: You may approach the 
witness and examine the exhibit. 
MR. BARKER: I have no objection to 
admission of Exhibit A, with the exception 
of the two attached pages, just because I 
don't have a copy, I don't think, and I am 
not familiar with their contents. 
THE COURT: What are the two 
attachments, Counsel? 
MR. WEEKS: Let me let you look at 
them. They are kind of hard to describe. 
THE COURT: You ought to make a record 
on foundation. 
Q. Mr. Kessimakis, you indicated these were 
prepared as your trades were made in the joint 
account? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is this a format that you set up? 
A. Yes. 
Q. This what I call a Venetian blind or 
something that kind of folds? And you sat there. 
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Did you sit with the girl and show her what to do and 
write down here? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was off trading slips; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that, basically, is a — your own 
record of the trading slips as they came in? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did you do your own record in addition 
to trading slips? 
A. I just wanted to keep track of everything. 
Q. Do they show more -- these little hard 
pages show a little different view of the account 
than the trading slips? 
A. No, I don't think so. 
Q. You think they are exactly like the trading 
slips? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do they show more information than the 
trading slips show? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. You say they are just taken right off 
there? 
A. Yes. They are right off the trading slips. 
Q. In your presence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Under your supervision? 
A. Yes. 
Q. By your girlfriend? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was her name? 
A. Claudia Zinner. 
Q. How long did you live with Claudia? 
A. Probably about I would say around seven 
. 
Q. During 1980 you were living with Claudia? 
A. Yes. 
MR. WEEKS: I have no other questions, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection to the 
exhibit? 
MR. BARKER: May I see it one more 
time, please? I have no objection to it 
being admitted, as long as we are talking 
about illustrating what those sheets say, 
which is what he has testified to, if I can 
have a photocopy of them. 
THE COURT: The exhibit is received. 
The clerk will provide copies at the break. 
64 
Other questions? 
Q. Let me ask you about the opening of the 
account. You indicated, briefly, that you went to 
Les Anderton, and that's Betty's brother? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You opened the account there. Was there a 
reason to use Les? 
A. Yes. I thought he would do a good job, and 
he was Betty's brother and a friend of the family. 
That's the reason why I chose him. He had a good 
track record. 
Q. Mr. Kessimakis, Betty has testified that 
you went to a 7-Eleven at one point in 1973, or '83. 
I guess it was 1993. She testified you went to the 
7-Eleven to talk to her. Do you recall going to a 
7-Eleven to talk to her about stock in the company? 
A. I have never been to a 7-Eleven to talk to 
her about stock. 
Q. Never on any occasion? 
A. Never. 
Q. Do you recall the last time Betty was in 
the Kessimakis Produce, either location? 
A. I don't ever remember her ever coming in. 
Q. Since the divorce? 
A. No. I never remember seeing her ever come 
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in. I don't think she would show her face in the 
produce company. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Because my brother dislikes her. And I 
don't think she would have nerve to come in. 
Q. So, to your recollection, she has never 
been in Kessimakis Produce? 
A. Never. 
Q. In either location? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have occasion to call Betty and 
tell her that Mike wanted to talk to her? 
A. I never did. 
Q. You have never asked her to go talk to Mike 
about financial --
A. My father dislikes her immensely. He would 
never ask me to call her. 
Q. Do you know if she went on her own? 
A. He would never invite her over. 
Q. Did he leave you a larger share of stock in 
the company? 
A. I really don't know. 
Q. You don't recall? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. What stock, what percentage of the stock do 
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you own now? 
A, Right now? 
Q. Right now. 
A. Fifty percent. 
Q. And your brother Gary owns the other 
50 percent? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that you didn't get any extra share in 
the split in the estate? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. The estate was settled in 1981; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There was no real estate in the company, so 
there was no reason for her to call you about any 
inheritance or anything out of Mike's estate that was 
real estate that the company may have had an 
ownership interest in? 
A* No. 
Q. Did ycu have occasion to try and get tax 
returns for the 1980 years, '81, f82? 
A. Yes. But -- we tried to get them, but they 
were not available. 
Q. You couldn't get those? Over the years you 
have heard her make statements that she talked to you 
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on several occasions about getting your stock. Did 
you give her any indication she was going to get 
stock after 1980? 
A. No, I did not. She never said a thing. 
Q. Did you tell her she was in your will for a 
fourth? 
A. No, I did not. I donft even have a will. 
Q. How many children do you have? 
A. Three. 
Q. But nobody — you have never told her that 
she was a fourth heir of your estate? 
A. No. 
Q. What is your title in the company? 
A. President. 
Q. Have you ever had any requests from Betty 
or her attorney for corporate records? 
A. Just recently. 
Q. Since the lawsuit was filed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Nothing prior to that? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever, in your capacity as an 
officer in the corporation, ever had any occasion to 
give her notice of annual meetings? 
A. She was never in the company, so I had no 
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